2 equal prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed'.
2 My counterarguments will appeal to a different kind of global equality of opportunity, 'global equality of opportunity for advantage', which is a form of luck egalitarianism. 3 Equality of opportunity for advantage states that levels of advantage 4 must reflect exercises of responsibility. 5 Where different individuals exercise their responsibility equivalently, and where different individuals do not exercise their responsibility, equality of advantage is justified. Where different individuals exercise their responsibility non-equivalently inequality of advantage is justified. Global equality of opportunity for advantage is simply an application of equality of opportunity for advantage to every individual on the planet, with no morally fundamental weight being given to national borders. As luck egalitarian positions such as equality of opportunity for advantage are usually treated as being by default global, 'asocial' views, with some 2 Rawls 1972, 73 . Miller also advances the same two general arguments against global equality of natural resources which, being further removed from luck egalitarianism, I do not consider. 3 The position differs from Arneson's (1989) 'equality of opportunity for welfare' in not being committed to welfare as its conception of advantage (Arneson (1999) now endorses a somewhat different 'responsibility-catering prioritarian' position). There are two differences between equality of opportunity for advantage and Cohen's (1989) 'equal access to advantage': a purely terminological difference between 'access' and 'opportunity', and a substantive difference due to Cohen's commitment to advantage being a combination of welfare and resources. 4 I understand advantage as a placeholder for whatever it is that egalitarian justice is concerned with distributing. Similarly, Miller refers to advantage as a neutral egalitarian currency; see Miller 2007, 68. 3 special justification needed for restricting their scope, 6 I will not hereafter distinguish between global and non-global forms of the view.
The article is arranged as follows. Section II addresses global equality of opportunity's (alleged) inability to specify a metric of justice which is broad enough to exclude spurious claims for redistribution, but precise enough to appropriately value different kinds of advantage. Section III considers the claim that global egalitarianism demands either too little redistribution, leaving the unborn and dissenters burdened with their societies' imprudent choices, or too much redistribution, creating perverse incentives by punishing prudent decisions. Section IV concludes.
II. The Metric Problem
Any proponent of equality of opportunity will have to decide how fine-grained or broadgrained their metric of equality is in order to say what equal opportunities consist in. This
gives rise to what Miller calls 'the metric problem'. Neither a very fine-grained, nor a very broad-grained metric is appealing on his view:
If we make it too fine-grained, then we will get lots of meaningless results … -equalities and inequalities that just do not matter because they are too specific to engage our ethical attention. But if we try to make it as broad-grained as possible, then we run into controversy about how, if at all, different components of our metric should be evaluated relative to one another. 16 Rawls 1972; Dworkin 2000; Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2000; Hare 1981; Singer 1993 . The first of these may seem controversial, given that Rawls later (1993; 19 Miller 2007, 67-8. 20 See Barry and Gilabert 2008, 1038. understandings. If that was the case -if, for instance, global equality of opportunity was often based on the idea that there were shared global understandings of which opportunities mattered, and why -then Miller might not need to defend his assumption.
But if there ever has been a defence of global equality of opportunity in those terms it is of only marginal interest. 21 The standard position does not privilege cultural understandings, so if Miller wants to challenge global equality of opportunity he must explain why his assumption is better than the global egalitarian alternative.
In fairness, it should be noted that in the Introduction of the book Miller gestures towards some 'contextualist' arguments that might support his thesis, and he has written on the subject elsewhere in too much detail for me to enter into here. 22 But as these arguments have not been applied to the task of resisting global equality of opportunity we are left with the finding that Miller's metric argument comes uncomfortably close to assuming what it is supposed to be demonstrating -the falsity of global egalitarianism.
III. The Dynamic Problem
The It might be replied here that, while it is true that Ecologians' motive to conserve resources to help themselves later in life may be retained, part of the motivation for the Ecologians' prudent behaviour was that that allowed them to advantage their descendents. This second motivation -and hence, the desirable behaviour it supportedis undercut where their descendents will only have the same claims on resources as Affluenzian descendents. But I do not believe that it follows that, under equality of 28 Miller (2007, 119-23, 130-34, 161) seems to agree; indeed, he would even hold dissenters responsible for their nations' decisions, provided they are engaged in and benefiting from cooperative practices. Pierik 2008 disputes the relevance of the cooperative practice model when considering national responsibility. 29 Miller 2007, 70. 14 opportunity for advantage, the Ecologians will be significantly less motivated to save for future generations, for three reasons.
First of all, it is not true that Ecologians would be prevented from increasing the resources available to their descendents under equality of opportunity for advantage. The more that is available to future generations, the more that is available to individual Ecologian descendents. Their entitlements are calculated as an equal share of global opportunities for advantage, so if the world has more advantage to be shared out, Ecologians descendents will each have a bigger share. It is true that the Ecologian ancestors will not be able to have as strong an influence on the holdings of their descendents under the scheme I propose, but the influence they do have may still be sufficient to motivate prudent behaviour. Where Ecologia and Affluenza are the same size, Ecologians will, under equality of opportunity for advantage, have fifty per cent of the influence on future Ecologians' distributive shares that they would have had under a scheme that allowed them to pass on all of their saved benefits to their descendents. This should still be sufficient to motivate a high degree of prudent behaviour, given that, in many European countries, effective tax rates in excess of fifty per cent (once income, sales, property and inheritance taxes are taken into account) do not stop well-off people from working for themselves and their descendents. Furthermore, the actual impact of current Ecologians' sustainable development policies on future Ecologians' resource holdings is rather higher than fifty per cent when one remembers that the problem only arises because the Affluenzians are setting aside so little for future generations. If
Ecologia and Affluenza are of the same size and with constant populations, and the average Ecologian sets aside four units of resources for future generations and the average Affluenzian sets aside two units of resources for future generations, then the future generation of Ecologians will receive three units of resources each, two thirds of which is from their Ecologian ancestors. So it seems that under equality of opportunity for advantage, current Ecologians will still be able to significantly advantage future
Ecologians by conserving resources.
Second, although under equality of opportunity for welfare there will be some limit on the extent to which Ecologians can benefit their descendents, this may be partly or fully compensated for by a preference among Ecologians to conserve resources for the sake of future Affluenzians. Even in existing societies people are not indifferent to how foreigners fare, often giving money to overseas charity. Where, as we are assuming here, the global order is regulated by global egalitarian principles, cosmopolitan sentiments would have a much stronger grip on societies, so that many people would see benefitting foreigners as a matter of justice. This cosmopolitan motivation may not be as strong as the motivation to benefit compatriots, and certainly is not as strong as the common motivation to benefit descendents, but in combination with these motivations, which we have already seen will be largely retained, it may still be sufficient to ensure that sustainable policies are pursued. ' (2007, 71n.19) . 35 Miller 2007, 71 . 36 In support of his position, Miller suggests that the young Affluenzians' complaint is primarily against their predecessors, but 'it does not seem to be a matter of justice that our predecessors should leave us with any particular level of per capita resources, so long as the level does not fall below that required to sustain the institutions that make a decent life possible' (Miller 2007, 72 Barry and Gilabert 2008, 1036. 41 Tan (2008, 458) suggests that national responsibility and global egalitarianism are compatible, but he gives global justice priority, contrary to Miller's assumptions: 'if global justice can be shown to include some egalitarian commitments, then national responsibility will have to be understood within these parameters set by global justice'. 
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VI. Conclusion
